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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to compare three thinkers with respect to one moral issue.
The three thinkers are Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Thomas Hill Green.
Jeremy Bentham John Stuart Mill Thomas Hill Green
These are thinkers of three successive generations. The influence Bentham had on
Mill, as well as the influence Bentham and Mill had on Green, is undisputed. Unlike
Mill, however, Green did not see himself as a disciple of the utilitarian school, so one
could question whether Green is a natural follower of the first two philosophers.. It
will be demonstrated here that there is a notable progression of ideas from Bentham,
through Mill, to Green: a progression that throws light on the nature of the good.
The issue this paper will address is how each thinker dealt with the potential
conflict between the personal good and the common good. The ‘personal good’ is
synonymous with ‘the good of the individual’ or with ‘personal happiness’, while the
‘common good’ is synonymous with ‘the good of society’ or ‘general happiness’. A
common feature of the three philosophers is that each preferred to pre-empt the
1 I would like to thank Richard Cookson, Irena Nicoll and Philip Schofield for their help with this paper.
This paper was presented to the Bentham Seminar, UCL, 20 March 2003.
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possibility of such a conflict. They would rather see these two goods—the individual
and the social—as either in natural harmony with each other, or as essentially
reconcilable. What happens though in cases where such a conflict exists and cannot be
amicably resolved? It is a fact that cases where the personal good and the common
good are antagonistic exist and the three philosophers had to face up to this fact. My
task is to address each thinker in turn and see how his philosophy dealt with this
problem.
The paper focuses on the cases of irreconcilable conflict between the common
good and the personal good. It deals with two possible solutions to this conflict: when
it is resolved in favour of the first, and when it is resolved in favour of the second. We
shall see that the three thinkers tended to give priority to the common good over the
personal good (though this is less true of Mill than of the other two). However,
Bentham, Mill and Green were all genuinely concerned with the good of the
individual and all gave serious theoretical backing to this concern. As giving priority
to the personal good over the common good is a more difficult task than giving
priority to common good over the personal good, I have paid special attention to how
each of the three philosophers dealt with the former.
None of the three thinkers addressed directly the moral issue this paper raises.
So my aim is to find answers that are not readily available. In the process of
reviewing each thinker in turn, I will try to resolve the problems that are touched but
not dealt with. The conclusions are that (1) all three philosophers play an important
role in the process of emancipating the status of the personal good, (2) that addressing
the cases of irreconcilable conflict between the personal and the common good is an
essential part of any theory of the nature of the good, and finally that (3) T H Green’s
moral philosophy is best suited to give a satisfactory solution to such irreconcilable
conflicts.
1. Jeremy Bentham
For Bentham the good is pleasure (synonyms of pleasure being benefit, advantage,
happiness) and the opposite of pain (synonyms of pain being evil, mischief,
unhappiness). Bentham believed that human nature is such that we tend to pursue
pleasure and avoid pain. The metaphor which he uses is that nature has placed
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mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure.2 We
could fight against their domination but ultimately our thoughts and actions are
governed by them. With respect to the good, for Bentham, what the case ‘is’, is the
same as what the case ‘ought’ to be.3 It is not only that by nature we try to increase
pleasure and diminish pain, but also that we should aim to increase happiness, and
diminish unhappiness. If anything, Bentham’s emphasis on the normative character of
his principle—at least in the first pages of An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation—is stronger than on its descriptive character. Bentham’s point is that
if people did not pursue happiness, then what they did would be wrong. If people
believe that happiness is bad and pain is good then they have succumbed to caprice
instead of reason, they live in darkness instead of light.
The principle of utility recognises this subjection [to the governance of
the two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure], and assumes it for the
foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of
felicity by the hands of reason and of law.4
The principle of utility asserts both that we do in fact pursue pleasure and that
we should do so, because this is the reasonable thing to do. In explaining the nature of
the good Bentham reviews 14 kinds of pleasure. He refers to a wide and subtle range
of pleasures including pleasures of the intellect, social pleasures and so on. He
demonstrates that some pleasures are more complex than others—indeed that some
pleasures contain an element of pain, like the pleasure of relief which is possible only
as a result of the cessation of pain.
Bentham is very helpful in explaining how his utility principle differs from other
moral perspectives. He gives as examples two other principles which are adverse to
the principle of utility. These are the principle of ‘asceticism’ and the principle of
‘sympathy and antipathy’. The principle of asceticism is the opposite of the principle
of utility. Those who adopt it believe that pleasure is bad and pain is good. It may
seem incredible that someone could adopt such a principle, but Bentham points to two
2 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, edited by J. H. Burns and H. L.
A. Hart, Oxford, 1996, (The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham), p. 11. Hereafter IPML (CW).
3 For a good discussion about whether this constitutes the so called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ see P.
Schofield ‘Jeremy Bentham, the principle of utility and legal positivism’, inaugural lecture (London,
2002).
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classes of men who had embraced this principle—’a set of moralists’, that is, the
philosophers, and ‘a set of religionists’. The first have tried to condemn pleasure, the
second have tried to ‘make it a matter of merit and duty to court pain’.5 So the
religionists have gone further than the philosophers. The philosophers have tried to
make pain a matter of indifference, but they never proclaimed it to be something good.
They have also denounced pleasure, but not all pleasure—only basic, physical
pleasures. Philosophers have glorified refined pleasures but always under a different
name ‘the honourable’, ‘the glorious’, ‘the reputable’, ‘the becoming’.6 Although the
philosophers are more subtle than the religious people, their views tend to lead to the
same effect—to create an attitude of disapprobation of the principle of utility,
branding anyone who adopts this principle with the term ‘Epicurean’.
According to Bentham, the problem with the principle of asceticism is that it
cannot help us run our public life. It could guide private conduct but it is thoroughly
useless, indeed dangerous, when applied to the business of government. While the
principle of utility can be consistently pursued, the principle of asceticism cannot. If
only one tenth of humankind were to pursue it consistently, Bentham says, the world
would turn into hell.7
The other principle averse to the principle of utility is the principle of sympathy
and antipathy. The pitfall of this principle is its subjective character. According to this
principle, one approves and rewards an action if one happens to like it, and
disapproves or punishes an action if one happens to dislike it. According to Bentham,
an element of objectivity is needed. There must be some empirical evidence about the
nature of the action and Bentham believes that only the principle of utility provides
the desired objective criterion.
To recapitulate: the good is the increase of pleasure and the diminution of pain.
However, whose good is this? Is it the good of the individual or the good of the
community? The answer is both. For Bentham, defining the good of the individual is
the same as defining the good of the community. The community is made of many
individuals. In the same way in which the community is an aggregate of individuals,
the good of the community is an aggregate of the good of the individuals.
4 IPML (CW)., p. 11.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
6 Ibid., pp. 18-19.
7 Ibid., p. 21.
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Does Bentham envisage a conflict between the good of the individual and the
good of the community? When there is a conflict, how should it be resolved? Does the
good of the community override the good of the individual? Does Bentham consider
unconditional protection for certain areas of personal interest, in other words, does
Bentham allow space for rights? Before addressing these questions directly, I will
review in turn Bentham’s concern with the good of the individual, and his concern
with the good of society. We will then be in a better position to see what answers
Bentham can provide to these questions.
Bentham values the good of the individual. We can find evidence for this in at
least four areas of his studies: in his psychological hedonism, in his concern with the
security of the individual, in his criticism of the power of bureaucrats, and in his
defence of liberty. To start with, the element of psychological hedonism which is a
part of Bentham’s utilitarian theory, can be given a positive spin. Traditionally it has
been heavily criticised, on the assumption that psychological hedonism always
implies egoism or selfishness. The logic of this criticism is that if the good is pleasure
and pleasure exists as felt and experienced by the individual, then promoting the good
is the same as promoting selfishness. Therefore some of Bentham’s defenders have
argued that psychological hedonism is not a part of Bentham’s Utilitarianism.8 I think
that defining the good as the pleasant does not carry morally negative implications.
The fact that individuals pursue their own pleasure does not imply that they neglect
and disrespect the pleasure of others. My claim is that the hedonistic aspect of
Bentham’s utilitarianism casts the definition of the good in the light of the personal
good. Bentham wants to liberate the status of personal pleasure from the spell of
moral disapproval. Defending individuals in their pursuit of pleasure is one of the
revolutionary elements of Bentham’s utilitarian philosophy. It is brave to argue that
there is nothing wrong with the fact that individuals pursue their own pleasure. What
Bentham says is that seeking and finding pleasure is good; seeking and finding more
pleasure is even better. The philosophical claim that the pursuit of pleasure is good
emancipates the status of the personal good.
Defending the good of the individual is at the heart of the utilitarian doctrine.
However, later it will become clear that Bentham’s utilitarianism is not fully loyal to
this engagement with the personal good. Thus it is vital to constantly bear in mind,
8 See P. Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice, Oxford, 1990, pp. 26-7.
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regardless of the other aspects of Bentham’s philosophy, that there is an essential link
between defining the good as the pleasant and taking the good of the individual
seriously.
Bentham cared for the good of the individual understood not only as pleasure
but also as a long—term interest—a distinction which Bentham did not, but many
other philosophers did, find significant. Bentham believed that one of the most
important roles of the government is to provide security in which people could pursue
their own individual goals and pleasure with the least possible interference, unease
and frustration. Bentham was anxious to protect individuals against abuses of power
on the part of bureaucrats. Finally, Bentham’s views on liberty also took personal
interest to heart. He believed that people should be allowed the liberty to do as they
liked unless this caused harm to others.9 It could be argued that all these strands of
Bentham’s philosophy expressing concern with the good of the individual are put into
jeopardy by Bentham’s ardent critique of rights. 10 The argument in defence of
Bentham here is that his particular views on legislation and the function of the
government express genuine concern for what we nowadays call rights.11 In other
words, Bentham has an implicit, though not explicit theory of rights.
On the other hand, Bentham’s concern with the good of society rivals his
concern with the good of the individual. We can find its source in two main areas:
Bentham’s ‘second’ definition of the utility principle and in his preoccupation with
improving the system of legislation. Bentham defines the utility principle as
increasing the pleasant and decreasing the painful, but also as ‘the greatest happiness
of the greatest number’. This second definition of the good, as the greatest happiness
of the greatest number, means that the happiness of a single individual will always be
trumped by the happiness of a group of people. This has always caused serious
concern among liberal thinkers. But again, as was the case with psychological
hedonism, it is possible to give a positive spin to this definition. It must be right that
more happiness is better than less happiness; that more people being happy is better
than fewer people, or than only one person being happy. Again this is a revolutionary
9 I am indebted to Irena Nicoll for her help in the discussion of these issues.
10 Bentham’s reference to rights as ‘nonsense upon stilts’ is probably the most famous and often cited
expression concerning the nature of rights and used as an example of a philosophical criticism of rights.
11 See F. Rosen, ‘Bentham and Mill on Liberty and Justice’ in Lives, Liberties and the Public Good, ed.
G. Feaver and F. Rosen, Houndmills,, 1987, and P. Kelly, Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice.
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element in Bentham’s doctrine: the happiness of the majority is more important that
the happiness of the selected few.
Bentham’s commitment to the law also expresses his concern with the well—
being of the community. For Bentham things like stability, lack of anarchy, existence
of good legislation, good rules and norms are extremely important. Creating a society
with stable patterns of interaction where expectations can be sustained is the business
of any government. Bentham’s aversion to anarchy and his admiration of, and
commitment to, good laws demonstrates the importance for him of social well—being.
So far so good. Bentham cares about the good of individuals as individuals; he
also cares about the good of the community. The question is whether he envisages a
potential conflict and whether he offers a solution consistent with his utilitarian theory.
In the context of his critique of rights, Bentham makes the following statement:
‘The greatest enemies of public peace are the selfish and the hostile
passions: necessary as they are, the one to the very existence of each
individual, the other to his security. ... Society is held together only by
the sacrifice that men can be induced to make of the gratification’s they
demand: to obtain these sacrifices is the great difficulty, the great task of
government.’12
This quotation demonstrates that Bentham sees very clearly the possibility of a
conflict between the personal and the common good. Bentham also offers a solution
to this conflict—in this case he commends sacrifice of personal passions in the name
of public order. This may sound reasonable. However, this compromises the utility
principle, according to which good is what increases overall pleasure. The good, that
is, the pleasure, of those who seek gratification of their passions is being
compromised. Does the utility principle allow for sacrifice of pleasure? Is there not a
danger of slipping into the principle of asceticism? I do not believe Bentham could
give an answer to these questions. Such questions, however, bring us back to what I
briefly alluded to earlier—the double definition of the utility principle. One could see
the utility principle as consisting of two separate parts that do not necessarily fit
12 Bentham, Nonsense upon Stilts in Rights, Representation and Reform: Nonsense upon Stilts and
Other Writings on the French Revolution ed. P. Schofield, C. Pease-Watkin and C. Blamires, Oxford,
2002, p. 321.
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together (1) the good is what increases pleasure and diminishes pain: and this is so
equally for individuals and for groups of people, and (2) the good is the greatest
happiness of the greatest number.
The problem of the second way of defining the principle of utility is that it does
not allow space for defending the good of the individual in those cases where this
good is in conflict with the good of all. However, this definition "takes sides"—it
takes the side of the good of the community, in the event of conflict. While the first
definition seems to be fair to both the personal and the common good, it does not take
conflict into account, and accordingly, does not offer a solution to conflict.
In the case where a conflict between the personal good and the common good
exists, there are two options: when the conflict should be resolved in favour of the
first, and when the conflict should be resolved in favour of the second. How can a
single philosophical principle cover both sets of cases: the cases where the common
good should have priority over the personal good and the cases where the personal
good should be protected at all costs, that is, be proclaimed as a human right? Part of
the answer to this question is already implied in the question itself. To start with, it is
enough to agree that a moral theory should provide a solution to both cases, and we
could temporarily postpone the answer to ‘how’ this could be achieved. A theoretical
solution must be posited to reconcile the two cases.. It seems that, because of its
double definition of utility, the utilitarian doctrine is able to do this. Because of this
double definition, the doctrine is ambivalent with respect to its commitment to
individual welfare versus its commitment to social welfare. It is committed to both,
but not in a manner that offers philosophical reconciliation. This ambiguity can be
convenient, but because of the inconsistency inherent in it, it can lead to problems.
To conclude: Bentham’s utility theory does not offer philosophically consistent
solutions to the two possible outcomes of the conflict between the personal good and
the common good. Bentham resolves these issues in practice but not on a theoretical
level. On the one hand, in the case of security, freedom to pursue personal good is of
paramount importance. On the other hand, in the case of a lawful and orderly society,
the common good overrides personal interests. But how does this square with the
utilitarian theory is a question that remains unanswered.
2. J. S. Mill
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 6 (2003)
9
J. S. Mill’s understanding of the good, by definition, is similar, if not identical to
Bentham’s:
According to the principle of utility or ‘the Greatest Happiness Principle’:
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and
the privation of pleasure.13
As with Bentham, this is both a description of how things are, and how they
should be. In Mill’s terms, this is both a ‘theory of life’ and a ‘theory of morality’.14
But Mill goes on to do something which Bentham does not do. Mill introduces a
distinction between lower and higher pleasures. This is a very specific binary
distinction accompanied by strong assertions. Certain kinds of pleasure, Mill argues
‘are more desirable and more valuable than others’.15 Higher pleasures are derived
from the exercise of the higher faculties. Mill does not specify what lower pleasures
are, but they are connected with what he calls ‘a lower grade of existence’.16 The
basis of this opposition is the opposition between physical and mental pleasures. Mill
argues that all utilitarians have acknowledged priority of mental over physical
pleasures. However, with Mill this distinction acquires a greater significance than
with other utilitarians, as he develops a notably powerful and sustained polemic about
why higher pleasures are more valuable than lower pleasures.
First, they are always preferred by those who have experienced both. What can
be seen as a paradox from a utilitarian point of view is the fact that the exercise of
higher pleasures often goes together with some degree of suffering. People possessing
the higher faculty, argues Mill, require more, in order to become happy. They are
capable of more acute suffering and are susceptible to it , yet given a choice between
the two they would prefer higher pleasures. Secondly, lower pleasures are such that
we feel ‘unwillingness’ to indulge them. This unwillingness can be explained by
things like ‘pride’, ‘love of liberty and personal independence’, ‘the love of power’,
13 J. S. Mill, Utilitarianism, On liberty, Considerations on Representative Government, ed. Geraint
Williams, London, 1999, p.7. Hereafter, Utilitarianism.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 8.
16 Ibid., p. 9.
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‘the love of excitement’, and ‘a sense of dignity’.17 The final justification for the
preference of higher pleasures is that they are more likely to be beneficial to others. A
person of noble character will take pleasure in doing things that are good for others.
This accords well with the utilitarian principle, which, Mill states, aims not at the
agent’s own greatest happiness, but at the greatest amount of happiness altogether.18
This final justification of the pursuit of higher pleasures has a direct bearing on our
discussion of the possible conflict between a personal good and the good of all. It
demonstrates that contributing to the welfare of the community does not come at the
price of personal sacrifice of pleasure. If pleasures are understood as higher pleasures,
then the pursuit of personal pleasure may go hand in hand with the care for the good
of others. Therefore the concept of higher pleasures is a device for avoiding the
conflict between what is good for the individual and what is good for society.
As with Bentham, I will review Mill’s concerns with the social good and with
the individual good in turn—this time starting with Mill’s commitment to the social
good. In his essay Utilitarianism, Mill places very strong emphasis on the good of
everyone. Statements like the following one occur frequently in his essay:
I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the
justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian
standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent’s own happiness,
but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of
others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a
disinterested and benevolent spectator.19
Mill’s purpose in Utilitarianism is to defend the doctrine against a set of strong
criticisms. His dominant strategy is to portray utilitarianism as amenable to common
sense, and he tries to achieve this by arguing that his doctrine promotes the overall
well—being of society. He wants to dissociate utilitarianism from accusations of
egoism. In this sense, Mill’s promotion of the general happiness is an important part
of his defence of the principle of utility.
17 Ibid., p. 9.
18 Ibid., p. 12.
19 Ibid., p. 17.
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Mill portrays the desire for general happiness as part and parcel of the desire for
personal happiness. This is an argument that is characteristic of philosophers who
tend to defend the importance of common good and it is typically made by idealist
philosophers like T. H. Green, for example, as we shall shortly see. Mill claims that it
is possible to develop one’s character in a direction which makes the union between
the desire for general and for personal happiness habitual. Education should be used
‘to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his
own happiness and the good of the whole’. 20 This leads towards asserting the
importance of the general happiness because it implies that if we see our own interest
as diverging from the social interest we are showing weakness of character, and hence,
doing something wrong. Indeed, after putting across these ideas, the moralistic spirit
of the utilitarian doctrine becomes so overwhelming that Mill feels the need to soften
his tone. Until now Mill has been defending utilitarianism against those who claimed
that it was demeaning to human nature and therefore not a proper moral doctrine.
Eventually, he considers an accusation coming from the opposite direction: that,
portrayed like this, utilitarianism is too moralistic and puts too much pressure on the
individual to consider the good of all in every single action.
In the reply to this accusation, Mill’s defence of the common good is
considerably softer. His answer is that utilitarianism is concerned not with motives
but with outcomes. It does not attempt to exercise power over people’s thoughts, but
rather to encourage some responsibility with respect to the outcome of one’s actions.
It aims to provide guidelines about what is commendable. He points out that, in
practice, very few people—one in a thousand—are in a position to multiply the
happiness of others. Only a public benefactor ‘has it in his power to do this in an
extended scale’.21 The rest of us must settle for private happiness—our own and the
happiness of those closest to us. The utilitarian doctrine commends, but does not force
us, to do good for others. The doctrine is imperative only about what should not be
done; not about what should be done. The only obligation it imposes is that our
actions do not bring unhappiness to others. This argument reveals considerable
weakening of Mill rhetoric about how much utilitarianism is concerned with the
public good and its priority over the personal good. This naturally leads me to the
discussion of Mill’s engagement with the personal good.
20 Ibid., p. 18.
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Mill’s concern with the good of the individual has both utilitarian and non
utilitarian origins. Like Bentham, he links the good with what is pleasant and
renounces suffering for suffering’s sake. In other words, he explains the good through
what feels good to the individual. As I have already argued, while discussing
Bentham, this utilitarian credo has important implications for the status of the
individual, and therefore, of the individual’s good. The non utilitarian origins of
Mill’s defence of personal good are to be found in his apology for personal freedom
in On Liberty. Although the message there does not contradict his utilitarian beliefs,
his criticism of ‘social pressure’, ‘public opinion’ and ‘social stigma’ does not fit
naturally with the utilitarian commitment to ‘the greatest happiness and of the greatest
number’. Mill addresses a direct conflict between the social and the personal and
takes the side of the individual. The spirit of his defence of freedom in On Liberty is
exactly the opposite to the spirit of his claim that the individual should be encouraged
to see his good as part of the good of all. In On Liberty, Mill argues that the individual
should be left free to explore his own options, to pursue diverse,and if necessary,
eccentric, paths. Only by being free can he be creative and find the truth. In the long
run, society as a whole will benefit from this, but the emphasis in Mill’s passionate
rhetoric is not on the public good but on the importance of personal freedom. He
defends freedom for the sake of creativity, for the sake of truth, for the sake of
individuality, because only individuality can counterbalance mass mediocrity.
Does Mill acknowledge a conflict between the common good and the personal
good? He does by admitting that higher pleasures imply suffering: for example, the
suffering of renunciation of lower pleasures. Unlike Bentham though, he tries to
reconcile this conflict with utilitarian theory. For Bentham the priority of the common
good over the personal good is often unquestioned. He does not engage with
justifying the fact that this comes at the cost of sacrificing personal pleasure. Mill’s
way of dealing with the conflict is to argue that the sacrifice or the suffering implied
in the experience of higher pleasures does not diminish our pleasure. He
acknowledges a cost, but he portrays it as insignificant. The fact that we prefer higher
pleasures somehow disqualifies the suffering as an important ingredient of these
pleasures. As a result he does not give due recognition to the very fact of suffering,
21 Ibid., p. 20.
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and that suffering is the opposite of pleasure. He acknowledges but simultaneously
disguises a conflict.
Bentham’s solution is more straightforward and more realistic in the sense that
Bentham sees that certain people will remain displeased in their obedience to the law
and he does not feel the need to explain this discomfort in some positive light. He
does not make the extra effort which Mill does in order to reconcile personal
discomfort with the public good. This weakens the integrity of his utilitarian theory.
Mill, on the other hand, tries very hard to maintain this integrity but achieves this at
the cost of downplaying the realistic cost of personal sacrifice.
In the context of his defence of utilitarianism, Mill seeks reconciliation between
personal happiness and the happiness of the greatest number. He tries to achieve this
reconciliation by minimising the losses of personal happiness. His recognition of a
conflict is only implicit. However, in the context of his defence of freedom in On
Liberty he addresses a conflict between the individual and society and explains why
and where this conflict should be resolved in favour of the individual. If there is a
conflict between the personal good and the social good, and the personal good does
not pose any threat to society, the conflict should be resolved in favour of the personal
good. The reason for that is that an individual can develop properly only if he makes
independent choices. ‘[T]o conform to custom merely as custom does not educate or
develop in him any of the qualities which are the distinctive endowment of a human
being.’22 The idea is that personal development entails an element of defying social
stereotypes. There is a necessary dimension to the conflict between society and the
individual and winning this conflict is for the individual a test for personhood.
3. T. H. Green
Unlike his two utilitarian predecessors, Green introduced different concepts for the
good and the moral good. For Green, the good is what satisfies desire.23 The moral
good is human perfection found in activities which contribute to the well—being of
the community, and if possible, to the well—being of humankind. So for Green, how
human nature actually works, and how it should work, are two distinguishable states
of affairs. This can be explained by the fact that for Green, human beings are such that
they are capable of progressing from one stage to a higher stage. Human nature is
22 J. S. Mill, On Liberty, London, 1985, p. 122.
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essentially perfectible. Because of this process of self—development, there is a
difference between the ordinary good and the moral good.
The ordinary good (I call it ‘ordinary’ for convenience, to distinguish it from the
moral good) is what satisfies desire. We may desire pleasure, but Green insists this is
not always the case. Green thinks that utilitarians made a psychological mistake in
claiming that we always want pleasure. Green wants to establish a distinction between
the desired and the pleasant, and on the basis of this distinction, to demonstrate that
his moral theory differs from the utilitarian one. He argues that we desire self—
satisfaction, not pleasure. However, at this stage—the stage of defining ordinary
good—Green is not talking about sophisticated desires. I believe that Green’s
definition of ordinary good is much closer to the utilitarian definition of the good as
pleasant than he is prepared to admit. There cannot be a very important difference
between the pleasant and the desired, as well as between pleasure and self-satisfaction.
Locating the origin of the good in personal desire is one aspect of utilitarian
revolutionary thinking. A traditional moral theory would define the good as what is
reasonable. Defining the good as that which is desired (as opposed to that which is
reasonable), in essence, gives each individual access to moral authority, and this is a
very democratic thing to do. This is one reason why, I believe, all of these three
thinkers placed a high value on the good of the individual. The good is not divorced
from ordinary human nature, or from ordinary human pursuits which tend to be
personal.
The moral good is different from the ordinary good. It is still related to human
desire, however, not to just any desire, but specifically to the desire to do good for its
own sake. Green describes a process of gradual transition from the pursuit of ordinary
good, to the pursuit of moral good. His logic is as follows. The things we find
desirable tend to change. Simple pleasure usually brings only a transient feeling of
self-satisfaction, and often, its cessation is accompanied by pain. Therefore we start to
seek satisfaction in objects that bring us a lasting feeling of welfare. We develop
desires for things that are permanently good. What are these things? Green reviews
two related categories of things: personal improvement and involvement in social
activities. If we invest in developing a better character, we enjoy lasting benefits. If
we do things that are good for others, as well as for ourselves, the goodness of our
23 T.H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, Oxford, 1890, p. 178, section 171.
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action is magnified through the experience of others: the good does not finish when
we cease to enjoy it—it continues in the enjoyment of other people.
The moral good, like the ordinary good, is linked to human desire. However, it
is desired not so much for the personal benefits it brings to us, but because, through a
process of development, we learn to desire the good for its own sake, or the good of
others as much as our own good. There is a similarity between Green’s moral good
and Mill’s higher pleasures. Mill tried to develop a more sophisticated concept of
pleasure, and in a similar way to Green, he tried to unite personal perfection (high
faculties) with care for others (nobility of character). This, however, could be tricky.
If the notion of the pleasant is stretched too far, it loses what is essential to it, that is,
the absence of pain. As we saw, higher pleasures imply some experience of pain. The
same applies to Green’s notion of the desired—stretched too far it loses what is
essential to it, i.e., the achievement of one’s own well-being.
However, because the concept of the moral good is central to Green’s moral
philosophy, it is more thoroughly developed and more useful than Mill’s concept of
higher pleasures: more useful for the purposes of moral theory. First, it is more
enlightening with respect to our understanding of the nature of the moral good. It has
a more direct social bearing. Whereas in Mill the element of personal perfection is
stronger than the element of social awareness, this is reversed in Green. In a trade-off
between becoming an excellent musician and doing something that would be more
beneficial to society—accepting that these two could not be done together—Green
would always recommend doing the good thing for society. Green’s concept of
personal perfection is more deeply embedded in social well-being than Mill’s.
Secondly, Green’s concept of the moral good is more helpful than Mill’s concept of
higher pleasures because of Green’s greater awareness that there could be a conflict
between the pursuit of the ordinary good and the pursuit of the moral good. The
pursuit of the moral good implies suspension of purely personal interest. Personal
interest is legitimate in the pursuit of ordinary good but is not legitimate in the pursuit
of moral good. This is a significant sacrifice and involves exercising one’s power of
will. This could involve suffering and pain, but for Green, suffering and pain are not
necessarily bad. Bentham and Mill have, on occasions, deprived themselves of the
option to legitimise pain and suffering.
Both Mill and Green acknowledge suffering in the trade-off between lower and
higher pleasures or between ordinary and moral good, but Green gives due weight to
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this fact. He offers a more truthful representation of what it takes to pursue the moral
good and gives more credit to those who do get involved in the pursuit of the moral
good. Being a good person is not easy. It cannot necessarily be described as pleasant,
so it deserves appreciation when achieved. In this sense, Green is also more open
about the possible conflict between the pursuit of personal good and the pursuit of the
common good.
This leads us to the debate about how Green viewed the importance of the
common good and the personal good respectively. Green’s recommendation to
everyone to embrace the good of the community as one’s own good runs clearly
through both his practical political theory and his moral philosophy. Green defined
what the moral good is through the concept of the common good. In many contexts of
his philosophy moral good and common good can be seen as synonyms. And, as it
must have become clear from the discussion of the moral good, Green prioritises
moral good over ordinary good. Practically this means prioritising the common good
over the personal good.
Despite this wholehearted engagement with the good of the community, which
extends to the good of humankind, most of his critics nowadays accept that Green was
a liberal. Green was genuinely concerned with the good of the individual as well as
with the common good. First, he expressed this concern directly: "To speak of any
progress or improvement or development of a nation or society or mankind, except as
relative to some greater worth of persons, is to use words without a meaning."24
Secondly, he developed a theory of rights. According to Green, rights are powers
recognised as belonging to the individual by the society, on the proviso that these
powers will be used to contribute to the common good.25 Unlike Bentham who was
implicitly, but not explicitly concerned with rights, Green believed and argued that
there are certain "powers" to which the individual is entitled and the society should
provide those to him. And thirdly, defining the good via what is desired—a feature he
shared with Mill and Bentham—represents, as I have argued earlier, an emancipation
of the personal good.
What kind of solution does Green offer to the conflict between the personal
good and the good of all? Like Mill, Green wishes to pre-empt the conflict between
24 Ibid., p. 193, section 184.
25 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writings, ed. P. Harris and
J. Morrow, Cambridge, 1986, pp. 26-7, section 26.
UCL Bentham Project
Journal of Bentham Studies, vol. 6 (2003)
17
personal happiness and general happiness. Mill’s higher pleasures and Green’s moral
good are reconciliatory concepts. They try to fulfill the ambitious project of making
the pursuit of general happiness personally pleasant, of marrying the personal good to
the common good. However, Green addresses the potential conflict between these two
goods more successfully than does Mill. He is explicit about it: he reveals the costs of
its solution, and he offers an answer to it. As stated earlier, the conflict between the
personal good and the common good, when a conciliatory outcome is impossible, has
two possible solutions—either in favour of the common good, or in favour of the
personal good. Green provides a rationale for both cases. The solution he offers is the
following. Personal good can be sacrificed in the name of the common good when
this good is not crucial for personal flourishing and for the developing of one’s moral
personality. Personal good can be sacrificed when it has a limited, self-centred nature.
A justification for such a sacrifice is that these self-centred personal goods are not the
only personal goods we have at our disposal. We are capable of pursuing personal
goods that either have the potential to, or already do, embrace the common good. The
sacrifice and its cost—a degree of suffering—should be acknowledged.
Personal good should be of primary concern to society, the government and to
the legislators when this good is a necessary condition for the development of one’s
moral character. That means it is essential for one’s flourishing as well as for one’s
development into a moral agent. This is Green’s justification of rights. The cost is the
same—some degree of discomfort for those who have to abstain from preventing the
exercise of these rights. In both cases somebody’s interest has to give way. And both
cases boil down to the sacrifices made by individuals. Both cases are explained by the
process in which moral good overrides ordinary good. What makes Green more
coherent than Mill or Bentham in his treatment of the dichotomy between the good of
the individual and the good of the community is his dual definition of the good. His
own dichotomy between ordinary and moral good is helpful. In the cases of conflict
between the personal and common good—which are essentially the morally difficult
cases—resolution can be achieved through the process of moving from ordinary to
moral good. Another of Green’s advantages is his acceptance of some degree of
suffering. The failure to acknowledge a legitimate use of suffering deprives Bentham
and Mill of one of the philosophical tools to explain moral behaviour.
Conclusion
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When a conflict between the common good and the personal good is at stake,
traditionally, political theorists have given priority to the common good. The idea is
that, if society as a whole does well, eventually people as individuals will also benefit,
even if in the short term it will cost them some liberties and pleasures. For this reason,
terms like ‘individual good’ or ‘personal good’ frequently carry a degree of negative
connotation. The personal good has become a victim of the relationship between the
two kinds of good. Bentham, Mill and Green have done a lot for the emancipation of
this concept. The main source of the three thinkers’ defence of the individuals’ good
is their definition of the good as what is pleasant or desired. This gives serious weight
to personal freedom. And although there is more to the good than ‘what is pleasant’ or
‘what I happen to desire now’, the basic link between the good and the
pleasant/desired is purposefully maintained by all three thinkers even when they
discuss more complex forms of the good.
Bentham lacks the theoretical consistency of Mill and Green, but it could be
argued that he does not consider it to be of ultimate importance. His theory can offer
us specific solutions that can be satisfactory for all practical intents and purposes. Mill
explores—more than Bentham does—the potential of the utilitarian theory to defend
the status of personal good. Green’s philosophy turns out to be best suited for dealing
with the irreconcilable conflict between the personal and the common good, because
Green’s moral theory is sensitive to the process of development and change in the
nature of the good. It can allow for, explain, and resolve, a conflict between different
goods.
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